Learning from Conditionals by Eva, Benjamin et al.
Learning From Conditionals
Benjamin Eva∗ Stephan Hartmann† Soroush Rafiee Rad‡
March 20, 2019
Forthcoming in Mind
Abstract
In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: ‘How
should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional?’. A number
of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian
norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow
upon learning an indicative conditional. Here, we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely
accepted Bayesian norms is sufficient to identify a normatively privileged updating procedure for this kind
of learning. Along the way, we justify a privileged formalisation of the notion of ‘epistemic conservativity’,
offer a new analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem and emphasise the distinction between interpreting the
content of new evidence and updating one’s beliefs on the basis of that content.
1 Introduction
Indicative conditionals have been the source of much trouble for logicians, epistemologists, cognitive scientists
and philosophers of language. Although they appear to play a central role in logical and uncertain reasoning,
there is still no general consensus regarding their semantics or even whether they should be thought of as
propositions with determinate semantics at all (see e.g. Adams (1975), Edgington (1995), Bennett (2003)). It is
unsurprising then that the problem of assigning probabilities to indicative conditionals is equally controversial
(see e.g. Lewis (1976), Hajek (2012), Skovgaard Olsen et al. (2016)), and thus that the relationship between
indicative conditionals and the norms of Bayesian epistemology remains largely opaque (see e.g. Douven
(2015)). In this paper, we aim to clarify this relationship by addressing a specific question: How should
an agent change their beliefs when they learn an indicative conditional from a perfectly reliable information
source? This question is already the focus of a large literature (see e.g. Nayak et al. (1996), Uffink (1995),
Grove & Halpern (1997), van Fraassen (1981), van Fraassen et al. (1986)). However, in a recent survey,
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Douven (2012) concludes that all extant accounts are problematic (for a much more detailed discussion, see
Douven & Romeijn (2012)), and hence that a proper general account of updating probabilistic belief states
by indicative conditionals is yet to be formulated.
The most important existing approach to modeling the learning of indicative conditionals utilises the
formal machinery of probabilistic distance-minimisation. The idea is this: An agent has beliefs about a
set of propositions. These beliefs are represented by a prior probability distribution P . She then learns
new information which imposes a constraint on the posterior distribution Q. If the learned information is
the conditional A→ B, then (it is commonly assumed) the new distribution has to satisfy a conditional
probability constraint of the form Q(B|A) = p′ ≤ 1. The posterior probability distribution is then found by
minimising some distance measure between Q and P . Intuitively, the idea is that the agent should stay as
close as possible to their prior belief state whilst ensuring that the constraint implied by the new information is
satisfied. This can be made formally precise by utilising probabilistic distance measures such as the Kullback
leibler divergence (see e.g. van Fraassen (1981); Diaconis & Zabell (1982)). It turns out that minimising the
Kullback leibler divergence between the prior and posterior distributions is equivalent to conditionalising on
the material conditional A ⊃ B when the learned conditional probability constraint is extreme (Q(B|A) = 1).
Thus, the distance-minimisation approach reduces to simply conditionalising on the material conditional in
the simplest case where the learned indicative conditional is interpreted as imposing an extreme conditional
probability constraint.
However, this approach has been strongly criticised by Douven (2012), Douven & Romeijn (2012) and
Douven & Dietz (2011), who forward a range of examples where conditionalising on the material conditional
appears to yield strange and intuitively irrational updates. Furthermore, van Fraassen (1981) considers cases
where the learned indicative conditional is naturally interpreted as imposing a non-extreme conditional prob-
ability constraint of the form Q(B|A) = p′ ∈ (0, 1). In these cases, minimising the distance between the
prior and posterior distributions will generally diverge from simply Jeffrey conditionalizng on the material
conditional, and it is unclear which probabilistic distance measure (if any) yields the intuitively rational up-
date. Since these more general cases appear to involve learning experiences which are not easily describable in
terms of conditionalisation or Jeffrey conditionalisation, they take us beyond the confines of standard Bayesian
epistemology and seem to fall outside the purview of traditional Bayesian norms.
In this article, we defend (a particular variant of) the distance-minimisation approach against Douven
et al.’s purported counter examples and argue that conditionalising on the material conditional produces
reasonable and well motivated results in cases where the learned conditional is assumed to impose an extreme
conditional probability constraint (Section 2). We then move on to consider the more general situation where
2
the learned conditional is allowed to impose a non-extreme constraint. We argue that in this case agents
should be guided by a norm of epistemic conservativity, and compare ways in which this norm can be made
precise. Specifically, we contend that epistemically conservative agents should update on new evidence by
minimising a particular kind of probabilistic distance measure (an ‘f -divergence’) between their prior and
posterior credences (Section 3). In Section 4 we present an analysis of van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin example
in terms of f -divergence minimisation and note that different f -divergences give rise to different updates, none
of which is obviously superior to its competitors. In order to resolve this impasse, we then appeal to resources
from epistemic utility theory to identify a particular f -divergence (the Inverse Kullback leibler divergence) as
normatively privileged, and argue that agents should utilise that divergence if they hope to achieve maximally
accurate credences (Section 5). In Section 6 we utilise these considerations to develop a novel solution to
the Judy Benjamin problem (and to learning conditionals in general), compare that solution to competing
approaches from the recent literature, and draw an important and hitherto neglected distinction between
the question of how rational agents should update their beliefs after learning indicative conditionals and the
question of how rational agents should interpret the content of newly learned conditionals. We conclude by
describing how contemporary work in the psychology of reasoning can be usefully brought to bear on the
latter question, and raise some outstanding issues to be addressed in future work (Section 7).
2 The Material Conditional: A Defence
We are interested here in the question of how an epistemic agent should update their degrees of belief after
learning an indicative conditional of the form ‘If A, then B’. The existing literature on this question typically
operates on the basis of a couple of idealizing assumptions. Firstly, it is standardly assumed that the informa-
tion source from which the agent learns the conditional is completely trustworthy and reliable, so the agent
doesn’t have to worry about the possibility of being misled.1
Secondly, the agent has to translate the content of the learned conditional into a constraint on their
posterior credences. In the kind of learning experience to which (Jeffrey) conditionalisation is standardly
applied, the agent learns that a given truth-functional2 proposition H is either more or less likely than they
had previously thought, and this effectively imposes a constraint on the posterior probability of H (e.g.
P ∗(H) = 1).3 In contrast, the dominant approach to modeling the learning of conditionals assumes that
1See Bovens & Hartmann (2003) for models of learning from partially reliable information sources. Note, however, that these
models only consider the learning of truth functional propositions and cannot be straightforwardly applied to the learning of
conditionals.
2A terminological clarification: by ‘truth functional proposition’, we mean either an atomic proposition or a proposition that
can be generated from atomic propositions by the application of the standard truth-functional operations of classical logic (i.e.
negation, disjunction and conjunction).
3We denote the posterior probability distribution which results from (Jeffrey) conditionalisation by P ∗.
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learning the conditional ‘If A, then B’ imposes a constraint, not on the probability of any single truth-functional
proposition, but rather on the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent, P ∗(B|A). This
assumption is intuitively justified by the influential idea, commonly referred to as ‘Adams’ thesis’, that the
probability of the indicative conditional ‘If A, then B’ is given by the corresponding conditional probability
P (B|A). Although Lewis’ (1976) famous triviality results cast significant doubt on the general viability of
this position, it still seems plausible to contend that learning the indicative conditional ‘If A, then B’ from
a trustworthy source imposes a constraint on P ∗(B|A). For the majority of the paper, we will accept this
standard assumption as a given, and assume that epistemic agents can legitimately interpret the content of
newly learned indicative conditionals as constraints on the posterior conditional probability of the consequent
given the antecedent.4
Given these idealisations, the question of how one should update their credences after learning the con-
ditional ‘If A, then B’ reduces to the problem of how one should update their credences upon learning a
new value for the conditional probability P ∗(B|A). For example, one might learn that the probability of it
raining, given that there is a thunderstorm, is much lower than previously imagined, or that one’s chances
of developing heart disease given that one eats a lot of red meat is higher than expected. In the simplest
case, one would learn that P ∗(B|A) = 1, i.e. that A’s truth provides an absolute guarantee of B’s truth. But
this is equivalent to the constraint that P ∗(A ∧ ¬B) = 0, since both constraints simply state that there’s no
possibility of A being true and B being false. And of course, this means that the agent has really just learned
the truth functional proposition ¬A ∨ B =df A ⊃ B and hence that Bayesian norms demand that she should
update her credences by conditionalising on A ⊃ B. So from a Bayesian perspective, there is no puzzle in the
extreme case in which the learned conditional is interpreted as imposing the constraint P ∗(B|A) = 1. The
agent is duty bound to conditionalise on A ⊃ B, on pain of being susceptible to diachronic Dutch books (Lewis
(1999)) and failing to minimise expected inaccuracy (Greaves & Wallace (2006)).
Although the situation looks clear cut from a Bayesian perspective, a number of authors have criticised
the view that conditionalising on the material conditional provides a generally acceptable update procedure
for agents who learn indicative conditionals. In the rest of this section, we provide a response to these
criticisms and show that conditionalising on the material conditional performs remarkably well in a number
of purportedly problematic cases.5
4As well as being standard in the philosophical literature (see e.g. van Fraassen (1981), van Fraassen et al. (1986), Douven &
Dietz (2011), Douven & Romeijn (2012)), this assumption is also widely (although not universally) accepted in the psychology
of reasoning, where it has played an important role in the empirical study of dynamic conditional inferences (see e.g. Oaksford
and Chater (2007), Fernbach and Erb (2013)). But we stress again that we are concerned here only with how learning indicative
conditionals causes a rational agent to alter their credences over time, and take no definite position regarding the controversial
issue of how agents should attach probabilities to indicative conditionals at a given moment in time. We remain completely
agnostic about Adams’ thesis for the purposes of this paper.
5A similar conclusion is independently supported by Trpin (2018).
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2.1 The Case of Two Propositions
We begin with some formal preliminaries. An agent has beliefs about the propositions A and B. We introduce
binary propositional variables A and B (in italic script) which have the values A and ¬A, and B and ¬B
(in roman script), respectively. These beliefs are represented by a prior probability distribution P over the
possible values of A and B. In order to specify P , it is sufficient to fix the prior probability
P (A) = a, (1)
and the conditional probabilities
P (B|A) = p , P (B|¬A) = q. (2)
With this, the prior probability distribution over the variables A and B is given by
P (A,B) = a p , P (A,¬B) = a p
P (¬A,B) = a q , P (¬A,¬B) = a q , (3)
where we have used the shorthand notations P (A,B) for P (A ∧ B) and x for 1− x.
Next, the agent learns the natural language indicative conditional A→ B. For now, we assume that the
agent (legitimately) interprets the content of this conditional as imposing the extreme conditional probability
constraint P ∗(B|A) = p′ = 1, which, as we noted above, is equivalent to learning
MC (Material Conditional): A ⊃ B, which is equivalent to ¬A ∨ B.
She then updates her probability distribution using Bayesian conditionalisation and arrives at the new prob-
ability distribution P ∗(·) = P (·|¬A ∨ B). This distribution is given by (all proofs are in Appendix A):
P ∗(A,B) =
a p
a p+ a
, P ∗(A,¬B) = 0
P ∗(¬A,B) = a q
a p+ a
, P ∗(¬A,¬B) = a q
a p+ a
(4)
From this, we can show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1 (Simple Conditional – MC) An agent considers the propositions A and B and has a prior
probability distribution P according to eqs. (3) (with 0 < a, p, q < 1) defined over the corresponding proposi-
tional variables. Learning MC and updating by Bayesian conditionalisation then implies that the probability
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of A decreases and that the probability of B increases, i.e. P ∗(A) < P (A) and P ∗(B) > P (B).
Proposition 1 was first noticed by Popper & Miller (1983), and several authors have since cited the result
as symptomatic of the representational deficiency of the material conditional. Specifically, it has been widely
contended that it is implausible that the probability of the antecedent should decrease whenever we learn
an indicative conditional, and hence that conditionalising on the material conditional cannot be the rational
update procedure for this kind of learning. There are a couple of pertinent observations to be made here.
Recall that, following orthodoxy, we are working under the assumption that learning the indicative condi-
tional ‘If A, then B’ imposes a constraint on the conditional probability P ∗(B|A). We have noted that, in the
special case where this constraint is extreme, i.e. of the form P ∗(B|A) = 1, standard Bayesian epistemology
requires us to conditionalise on the proposition A ⊃ B. Now, there are at least two lessons that one could
plausibly draw from Proposition 1 (which have not yet been distinguished in the literature).
Firstly, one could draw the conclusion that conditionalising on A ⊃ B is not generally the rational response
to learning the constraint P ∗(B|A) = 1. Alternatively, one could draw the conclusion that it is not generally
legitimate to interpret the content of the learned conditional as an extreme conditional probability constraint.
The former conclusion concerns the norms of Bayesian epistemology, and the latter concerns the meaning of
conditionals. In recent work, these two conclusions have been unduly conflated, which has unsurprisingly led
to significant confusion.
We take the latter conclusion to be entirely uncontroversial and obvious from reflection on the actual use
of conditionals in everyday discourse and reasoning. When somebody warns you that ‘if you smoke, you’ll
get lung cancer’, you typically interpret the content of that statement not as ‘if you smoke, you will certainly
get lung cancer’, but rather as ‘if you smoke, you will have a significantly increased risk of lung cancer’, i.e.
you interpret the conditional as imposing a non-extreme conditional probability constraint. In light of this
observation, it is clear that conditionalising on the material conditional is not, in full generality, the rational
update procedure for agents who learn indicative conditionals (since it will not generally respect the learned
constraint). But, to the best of our knowledge, nobody is actually defending the position that conditionalising
on the material conditional is always the rational response to learning an indicative conditional. Clearly,
this update procedure is meant only for the special case in which the learned conditional can be legitimately
interpreted as imposing an extreme conditional probability constraint. So Proposition 1 is only problematic
if, in those special cases, it is sometimes intuitively irrational to become less confident in A after learning
‘If A, then B’. If that were the case, then the import of Proposition 1 would be far greater than previously
recognised, since it would seem to constitute an argument against Bayesian conditionalisation in general.
Fortunately, it is, in full generality, intuitively rational to become less confident in A when we learn that A’s
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truth counts as a guarantee of B’s truth.
To see this, consider the four maximal conjunctions or ‘possible worlds’ over which P is defined (A ∧ B,
A ∧ ¬B, ¬A ∧ B and ¬A ∧ ¬B). When we learn the indicative conditional ‘If A, then B’, interpreted as the
constraint P ∗(B|A) = 1, what we learn is that the actual world is not a world at which A is true and B is
false. Thus, we rule out half of the logically possible worlds at which the antecedent is true. Any probability
mass that was stored in those worlds will then have to be transferred to other worlds, some of which will be
worlds at which the antecedent is false. So it is unsurprising that the antecedent becomes less probable when
we learn the indicative conditional. For, the learned conditional explicitly rules out some of the ways in which
the antecedent can be true. This is just an instance of the general phenomenon that the more informative
a proposition is, the less likely it is to be true. When we learn the indicative conditional, the antecedent
becomes more informative (and hence more easily falsifiable) and less probable. This is an intuitive and
unproblematic observation. More generally, it is clear that when the agent interprets the learned evidence as
imposing the constraint that P ∗(B|A) = 1, they have really just learned the proposition A ⊃ B, and all the
usual rationality arguments for conditionalisation apply. There is nothing special about this case that renders
conditionalisation inapplicable.
However, Douven & Dietz (2011), Douven (2012) and Douven & Romeijn (2012) have presented a range of
cases which purport to show that, even in the special case where the learned conditional can be legitimately
interpreted by an extreme conditional probability constraint, conditionalising on the material conditional
leads to problematic results. We turn now to providing a detailed analysis of these examples. In what
follows, we call conditionals which can be interpreted as imposing extreme conditional probability constraints
‘strict conditionals’, and accept Douven et al.’s presumption that the conditionals learned in the prospective
counterexamples can reasonably be construed as strict (even if this might reasonably be deemed an unrealistic
idealisation).
2.2 The Case of More than Two Propositions
Douven and collaborators have presented several examples that are meant to show that conditionalising on
the material conditional leads to counter-intuitive consequences, even when the learned conditional is strict.
Specifically, the following example is supposed to show that learning a strict conditional can sometimes
cause the probability of the antecedent to increase, which, in light of Proposition 1, is incompatible with
conditionalising on the material conditional.
The Ski Trip Example. Harry sees his friend Sue buying a ski outfit. This surprises him a bit, because he
did not know that she had any plans to go on a ski trip. He knows that she recently had an important
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exam and thinks it unlikely that she passed it. Then he meets Tom, his best friend and also a friend
of Sue’s, who is just on his way to Sue to hear whether she passed the exam, and who tells him: “If
Sue passed the exam, her father will take her on a ski vacation.” Recalling his earlier observation,
Harry now comes to find it more likely that Sue passed the exam. So in this example upon learning
the conditional information Harry should intuitively increase the probability of the antecedent of the
conditional.6 (Douven & Dietz, 2011)
We begin by noting that in the ski trip example, the agent entertains three propositions, and not only two
as in Proposition 1. What’s more, the agent does not only learn an indicative conditional, but also another
proposition, i.e. that Sue bought a new ski outfit. Clearly, a Bayesian agent also has to conditionalise on this
information (a fact that was not taken into account by Douven & Dietz (2011), Douven (2012) and Douven &
Romeijn (2012)). If one does so, then (modulo one further plausible assumption about Harry’s prior beliefs)
one obtains the intuitively correct result, as we will show now.
We introduce three binary propositional variables: The variable E has the values E: “Sue passed the
exam”, and ¬E: “Sue did not pass the exam”. The variable S has the values S: “Sue’s father invites her for
a ski trip”, and ¬S: “Sue’s father does not invite her for a ski trip”. The variable B has the values B: “Sue
buys a new ski outfit”, and ¬B: “Sue does not buy a new ski outfit”. We represent Harry’s prior and posterior
credences by the probability distribution P and P ∗, respectively. From the story, it is clear that Harry has
low initial credence in B, E and S. Thus, we can safely assume that both P (¬E,S,B) and P (¬E,¬S,B) are
quite close to zero.7 During the course of the example, Harry learns two new pieces of evidence:
Ski1: B
Ski2: E ⊃ S.
Armed with the assumption that both P (¬E,S,B) and P (¬E,¬S,B) are small, it is possible to show (see
Appendix B.1) that under a wide class of plausible formal reconstructions of the example, conditionalising on
Ski1 and Ski2 will lead Harry to increase his credence in E, which is exactly the desired result. The probability
of the antecedent will increase when we conditionalise on both the material conditional and the auxiliary
proposition B. Thus, the ski trip example does not undermine the view that upon learning a (strict) indicative
conditional, a Bayesian agent should simply conditionalise on the corresponding material conditional. Previous
analyses of this example simply failed to take into account the fact that, in the example, the agent learns
more than just the conditional.8 It is unsurprising that when this extra information is neglected, the resulting
6Note that the interpretation of the conditional as strict in this example can easily be made more plausible if we imagine that
the learned conditional is rather “If Sue passed the exam, her father will definitely take her on a ski vacation.”
7Since it is specified that P (S) and P (B) are both low and the variables S and B are obviously (strongly) positively correlated.
8One might plausibly contend that B should be treated as part of Harry’s background knowledge, rather than something he
8
update seems irrational. More generally, the ski trip example does nothing to cast doubt on the view that
upon learning a strict indicative conditional, the antecedent will never increase in probability. Certainly, the
net effect of a compound update in which a strict conditional is learned together with some other propositions
might be to increase the probability of the antecedent (as shown above), but that increase is not due to the
learning of the conditional itself. Rather, it occurs in spite of the learning of the conditional, and is due
entirely to the acquisition of additional evidence (in this case, the auxiliary proposition B).
Let us now turn to the second prospective counterexample:9
The Sundowners Example. Sarah and her sister Marian have arranged to go for sundowners at the West-
cliff hotel tomorrow. Sarah feels that there is some chance that it will rain, but thinks they can always
enjoy the view from inside. To make sure, Marian consults the staff at the Westcliff hotel and finds out
that in the event of rain, the inside area will be occupied by a wedding party. So she tells Sarah: “If
it rains tomorrow, then we cannot have sundowners at the Westcliff.” Upon learning this conditional,
Sarah sets her probability for sundowners and rain to 0, but does not change her probability for rain.
Thus, in this example, learning the conditional information has the effect of leaving the probability of
the antecedent unchanged.10 (Douven & Romeijn, 2012)
To begin, we introduce two binary propositional variables. The variable R has values R: “It will rain
tomorrow”, and ¬R: “It will not rain tomorrow”. The variable S has the values S: “Sarah and Marian have
sundowners”, and ¬S: “Sarah and Marian do not have sundowners”. According to the story, Sarah learns
Sun1: R→ ¬S. We assume that Sarah represents this indicative conditional by the material conditional
R ⊃ ¬S, which is logically equivalent to ¬R ∨ ¬S.
Assuming that 0 < P (R), P (S|R), P (S|¬R) < 1, we can then use Proposition 1 and conclude that P ∗(R) <
P (R), which conflicts with our intuitive judgment that the probability of rain should remain unchanged. At
first glance, this example is more difficult to analyse than the ski trip example because it seems that Sarah
only learns the conditional, and there is no additional evidence to explain why her update should conflict with
Proposition 1.
explicitly updates on when he learns the conditional. But this poses no problems for our analysis. We can also assume that
Harry starts with a credence function P , which he later updates after learning B (which will then form part of his background
knowledge), and only subsequently comes to learn the conditional. Because conditionalisation is a commutative operation (the
order in which propositions are learned makes no difference to the posterior function we end up with), this is formally equivalent
to treating B as part of the learning experience in the example. Our argument still works in exactly the same way.
9Note that Douven & Romeijn (2012) also consider a third salient example (the ‘driving test example’) that is structurally
analogous to the ski trip example, but in which it is intuitively rational for the agent to decrease their credence in the antecedent
of the learned conditional. Since this does not yield any direct conflict with Proposition 1, we do not address it here.
10Again, we can make the analysis of the example in terms of strict conditionals more plausible by changing the learned
conditional to “If it rains tomorrow, then we definitely cannot have sundowners at the Westcliff.”
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In order to see what’s gone wrong here, it is helpful to consider what motivates the intuition that Sarah’s
credence in R should remain fixed across the learning experience. Importantly, we have stipulated that Sarah
trusts Marian completely and so will assume that Marian has a good reason for asserting the conditional, for
example that there is going to be a wedding party at the hotel. What’s more, Sarah will certainly consider this
reason (whatever it may be) to be probabilistically independent of R. Clearly, whether or not the sisters can
have sundowners inside in the event of rain has nothing to do with whether it will in fact rain, and this is why
we think Sarah’s credence in R should remain unchanged. Whatever caused Marian to assert the conditional
has nothing to do with the possibility of rain. But the example, as presented by Douven & Romeijn (2012) and
formalised above, implicitly assumes this background structure in order to motivate the desired verdict (that
Sarah’s credence in R shouldn’t change), whilst neglecting it entirely when it comes to formally modeling
Sarah’s update in terms of conditionalising on the material conditional. When this background structure
is properly taken into account, conditionalising on the material conditional will straightforwardly yield the
intuitive verdict, as we will shortly show.
Another way to illustrate the reasoning above is to employ the distinction between the semantic and
pragmatic content of an utterance (see e.g. Szabo (2005)). Roughly, the semantic content is the content
that is explicitly conveyed by the speaker’s words whereas the pragmatic content encompasses all the extra
content that would need to be conveyed in order for the utterance to be felicitous in the given context, or
that would automatically be inferred by any competent listener upon hearing the utterance in that context.
Thus, when Sarah says ‘If it rains tomorrow, then we cannot have sundowners at the westcliff’, the semantic
content of her utterance can be interpreted by the material conditional R ⊃ ¬S. However, it is clear that upon
hearing this utterance any competent listener would automatically infer that in the event of rain, something
will prevent them from having Sundowner’s, and this therefore forms part of the pragmatic content of the
utterance. Alternatively, if we assume that what makes an utterance felicitous is its accordance with Grice’s
maxims (1975), then we can invoke the maxim of quantity – ‘make your contribution as informative as is
required’ – to make the same point. Part of what Marian needs to convey in order for the conversation to be
successful is that in the event of rain, something will stop them from having sundowners inside. So in order for
her utterance to be felicitous, this must be part of its content. Specifically, it must be part of the utterance’s
pragmatic content. The plausibility of this contention is further reinforced when we notice that in ordinary
discourse, it would seem strange to distinguish between the content of the utterances ‘If it rains tomorrow,
we cannot have sundowners’ and ‘It it rains tomorrow, something will prevent us from having sundowners’.
In order to model all the relevant aspects of Sarah’s epistemic state, we introduce a third propositional
variable D (for ‘disabler’) with the values D: “In the event of rain, something (e.g. a wedding party) will
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prevent us from having sundowners inside”, and ¬D: “In the event of rain, nothing will prevent us from
having sundowners inside”. Just like R, D is a disabler for S: R will prevent Sarah and Marian from having
the sundowners outside, and D will prevent them having sundowners inside. If we make the simplifying
assumption that Sarah is certain that the only thing that could prevent them from having sundowner inside is
a wedding party, then D can be identified with the proposition ‘there will be a wedding party at the hotel’.11
It is part of Sarah’s background knowledge that there will be no sundowners if R and D are instantiated, i.e.
R ∧D→ ¬S. (5)
In probabilistic terms, this means that the prior probability distribution satisfies the constraint P (¬S|R,D) = 1
and hence
P (R,S,D) = 0. (6)
Furthermore, it is clear (as we argued above) that Sarah regards R and D as being probabilistically indepen-
dent. Whether or not it will be possible to have sundowners inside in the event of rain is entirely independent
of the question whether or not it will rain in the first place. When Marian learns that a wedding party
has reserved the inside area in the event of rain, she doesn’t take this information to render the prospect of
rain any more or less likely then before. Indeed, this is exactly the intuition that motivates the claim that
Sarah should not change her credence in R when she learns the conditional. We can also employ the causal
structure of the example to make the same point. Intuitively, both R and D causally influence S, but they do
not causally influence one another (and there is no obvious non-trivial common cause). Applying the causal
Markov condition to this intuitive picture of the causal structure licenses the conclusion that R and D are
probabilistically independent (see e.g. Sprites et al. (2000)).
Finally, the example assumes that Sarah considers Marian to be a perfectly reliable information source and
interprets the conditional R→ ¬S as a strict conditional. Hence, she ensures that the posterior conditional
probability of S given R is zero (which is ensured by conditionalising on R ⊃ ¬S). But, as we noted above, if
Sarah truly regards Marian as perfectly reliable, then of course she should additionally conditionalise on D, i.e
she should conditionalise on there being some reason that they won’t be able to have sundowners inside in the
event of rain. If she leaves the probability of D below 1, then in her posterior beliefs, she will simultaneously
be certain that sundowners is impossible in the event of rain and be uncertain about whether there is any
reason that they can’t have sundowners inside in the event of rain. Clearly, when Marian tells Sarah that
they can’t have sundowners in the event of rain, part of the content of her assertion is that there is some
11Maybe Sarah does not think about a wedding party when she makes up her prior beliefs. But she will certainly take into
account that there is some disabler that will have the result that they cannot have sundowners inside. Indeed, the story specifies
that Sarah ‘thinks they can always enjoy the view from inside’, i.e. her prior for D is low.
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reason that they can’t have sundowners inside (what else could have caused her to assert the conditional?),
and Sarah needs to take this into account when she changes her beliefs. Specifically, as well as conditionalising
on Sun 1, Sarah should additionally conditionalise on
Sun2: D
Together, these observations are sufficient to obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 (Sundowners Example – MC) An agent considers the propositions R,S and D and has
a prior probability distribution P defined over the corresponding propositional variables. R and D are proba-
bilistically independent and P satisfies eq. (6). Learning Sun1 and Sun2 and updating by Bayesian condi-
tionalisation then implies that P ∗(R) = P (R).
The crucial point here is that when Marian asserts the conditional ‘If R then not-S’, part of the conversa-
tional implicature of her assertion is that there is some reason that they won’t be able to have sundowners in
the event of rain, and it is part of the sisters’ epistemic common ground that any such reason will be entirely
independent of whether it will in fact rain. This is what motivates the intuition that Sarah should not change
her credence in rain after learning the conditional. It is not surprising that when we omit these important
structural features from our probabilistic representation of Sarah’s epistemic state (and her subsequent up-
date), we obtain peculiar results. Proposition 2 shows that when all of this extra structure is properly taken
into account, Sarah’s learning experience can be adequately modeled in a Bayesian framework. Overall, we
have reached the following conclusions:12
1. Updating by conditionalising on the material conditional leads to perfectly plausible results if there are
only two propositions involved.
2. If more than two relevant propositions are involved, then these have to be accounted for and modeled in
a proper way. More specifically, the ski trip example turns out to be unproblematic if one conditionalises
not only on the material conditional but also on the relevant additional evidence. To properly account
for our intuitions, it is also important to take account of the probabilistic independencies that are implied
by the intuitive causal structure of the examples.
3. Conditionalising on the material conditional also produces the desired result in the sundowners example.
In this case the extra proposition D is not explicitly stated, but its presence is implicitly assumed in
12We should stress here that these conclusions do not commit us to the view that natural language indicative conditionals
can in general be adequately modelled by the material conditional. Indeed, these conclusions are all perfectly compatible with
Adams’ thesis (according to which the probability of an indicative conditional is given by the relevant conditional probability,
and not the probability of the material conditional), since conditionalising on the material conditional is equivalent to imposing
an extreme conditional probability constraint on the posterior distribution. Furthermore, the next section makes clear that the
material conditional is fundamentally incapable of adequately modeling the learning of non-strict conditionals.
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motivating the ‘intuitively correct’ response to the learning experience.
3 Non-Strict Conditionals and Distance-Minimisation
In the previous section, we defended the position that conditionalising on the material conditional is generally
the rational update procedure for learning strict indicative conditionals (although there may be situations
in which the material conditional does not exhaust the conversational implicature of the strict conditional,
in which case the implicit (pragmatic) content of the assertion should also be taken into account). For the
remainder of the paper, we will focus on the more general case in which the learned conditional is non-strict,
i.e. it cannot be legitimately interpreted by an extreme constraint of the form Q(B|A) = 1, but only by a
non-extreme constraint of the form Q(B|A) = p′ ∈ (0, 1). By way of illustration, consider van Fraassen’s
famous Judy Benjamin example:
The Judy Benjamin Example. A soldier, Judy Benjamin, is dropped with her platoon in a territory that
is divided in two halves, Red Territory and Blue Territory, respectively, with each territory in turn
being divided in equal parts, Second Company area and Headquarters Company area, thus forming four
quadrants of roughly equal size. Because the platoon was dropped more or less at the center of the
whole territory, Judy Benjamin deems it equally likely that they are in one quadrant as that they are
in any of the others. They then receive the following radio message: “I can’t be sure where you are. If
you are in Red Territory, then the odds are 3 : 1 that you are in Second Company area.” After this,
the radio contact breaks down. Supposing that Judy accepts this message, how should she adjust her
degrees of belief? (van Fraassen, 1981)
Here, Judy learns a conditional that should be interpreted as telling her to increase her estimate of the
conditional probability of being in the Second Company area given that she is in Red Territory, but not all
the way to one. Clearly, it would be a mistake to conditionalise on the material conditional ‘Red Territory
⊃ Second Company area’, since that would result in mistakenly ruling out the possibility of being in Red
Territory and the Headquarter area. So we need a more general approach to learning conditionals that is
able to guide agents through this kind of learning experience. In particular, we need to identify the rational
updating procedure for agents that learn a constraint of the form Q(B|A) = p′ ∈ (0, 1).13
The dominant approach to this problem in the literature is to argue that agents who learn non-extreme
conditional probability constraints should be guided by a norm of conservativity. In particular, they should
13Huisman (2017) actually argues that the rational response to the Judy Benjamin example is to adopt indeterminate posterior
credences. Here, we aim to stay within the standard Bayesian paradigm and identify a rational update procedure that yields
precise and probabilistic posterior credences.
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update their credences in a way which ensures that their new credences (i) satisfy the learned constraint,
and (ii) are as close as possible to their original credences, i.e. they should not change their beliefs in ways
which are not necessitated by the new evidence. Of course, this is just an instance of the general normative
principle that agents should change their beliefs conservatively in the face of new evidence. This principle
has played a fundamental role in both Bayesian epistemology and the theory of qualitative belief revision (see
e.g. Ga¨rdenfors & Rott (1995)). In what follows, we will take it for granted that rational agents should be
guided by a norm of epistemic conservativity, and ignore recent controversies regarding whether that norm
should ever be sacrificed in the interests of alternative epistemic goods (see e.g. Myrvold (2018)). Rather, we
will focus on the question of how this norm should be made precise in a probabilistic setting and how it can
be applied to guide Bayesian agents who learn non-strict conditionals, as in van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin
example.
More specifically, we are interested in the task of identifying exactly which notion of ‘closeness’ is appro-
priate when we demand that epistemic agents should try to remain ‘as close as possible’ to their original
credences when updating on new evidence. What’s the right way to measure the distance between two dif-
ferent probabilistic belief states here? Without an answer to this question, the conservativity norm is not
sufficiently precise to provide any concrete advice regarding how agents should update their beliefs in the face
of new evidence.
3.1 Formalising Conservativity
It turns out that there are many ways to measure the distance between different probability distributions.
For example, imagine that we want to measure the distance between the distributions P and Q, defined over
some common set W of possible worlds. One natural (and widely employed) option is to use the Euclidean
squared distance between P and Q, D(P,Q) =
∑
w∈W
(P (w)−Q(w))2. The problem with this approach is
that if we apply the conservativity norm with this notion of closeness, we will end up advocating update
procedures that conflict with existing Bayesian update rules in strange and problematic ways. In particular,
suppose that an agent learns the constraint that the posterior probability of some truth functional proposition
A should increase to a particular value Q(A) = a′ < 1. Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010) showed that minimising
the Euclidean squared distance to this constraint yields a new update rule (now known as ‘Leitgeb-Pettigrew
updating’ or ‘LP-updating’) according to which the agent should add some constant value to the probability
of all possible worlds in which A is true. Levinstein (2012) showed that this update rule yields absurd and
patently irrational updates in many cases. For example, if an agent initially believes two propositions A and
B to be independent and then encounters some evidence that makes them far more confident in the truth of
14
A, LP-updating can lead them to radically revise their credence in B, even though they previously considered
A and B to be independent and the learned evidence doesn’t appear to bear on that consideration in any
way.14 The fundamental problem here is that LP-updating does not preserve the conditional probability ratios
between the considered propositions, i.e. it is not a ‘rigid’ updating procedure.
It is well known that the only updating procedure that is guaranteed to preserve all relevant conditional
probabilities in this kind of learning scenario is Jeffrey conditionalisation, which is widely accepted as the
rational update procedure for Bayesian agents in cases of ‘ineffable learning’, i.e. cases where the agent gains
evidence that makes them more confident of some proposition without becoming certain of any proposition.
As well as having the important property of preserving conditional probabilities, Jeffrey conditionalisation
has also been justified by diachronic dutch book arguments (Skyrms (1984)). In what follows, we take it
for granted that Jeffrey conditionalisation is the rational update procedure for agents who undergo ineffable
learning. Of course, we acknowledge that this might be a controversial step since some authors contend that
Jeffrey conditionalisation is only a rational updating procedure in some circumstance (see e.g. Schwan & Stern
(2017)), but given the widespread acceptance of Jeffrey conditionalisation in the Bayesian canon and the lack
of any plausible alternative probabilistic updating rules, we take it that this assumption does not lessen the
philosophical import of our conclusions.
Once we assume that rational agents should update by Jeffrey conditionalisation, we are able to rule out
the Euclidean squared distance as a formalisation of epistemic conservativity. For, agents who try to be
epistemically conservative in the sense captured by the Euclidean squared distance will employ LP-updating
instead of Jeffrey conditionalisation in cases of ineffable learning, and will therefore end up committing the
kinds of reasoning errors described by Levinstein (2012). The question now is whether there are alterna-
tive ways of formalising epistemic conservativity that do not conflict with Jeffrey conditionalisation and are
therefore compatible with existing Bayesian update rules. Happily, there exists a whole class of probabilistic
distance measures that satisfy exactly this property.
Definition 1 (f-divergence) Let S1, . . . , Sn be the possible values of a random variable S over which prob-
ability distributions P (= the prior distribution) and Q (= the posterior distribution) are defined. The f -
divergence between Q and P is then given by
Df (Q||P ) :=
n∑
i=1
P (Si) f
(
Q(Si)
P (Si)
)
,
14Specifically, Levinstein presents a case in which the agent has very high prior high credences in the propositions R: “The
colour of the car behind the door is red” and ¬G : “Ghosts don’t exist”. Of course, she considers R and ¬G to be probabilistically
independent. She then catches a glimpse of the car and becomes confident that the car actually isn’t red. According to LP-
updating, this should cause her to become agnostic about the existence of ghosts (her credence in G will go from being close to
zero to being close to 1/2).
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where f is a convex function such that f(1) = 0.
f -divergences have a number of interesting properties (see Csisza´r (1967, 1975, 1991, 2008) for a more
detailed discussion): They are always non-negative and they vanish iff Q = P . However, unlike proper
distance functions, they are not necessarily symmetric and they may violate the triangle inequality. Examples
of f -divergences are the Kullback leibler divergence (f(x) = x log x), the inverse Kullback leibler divergence
(f(x) = − log x), the Hellinger distance (f(x) = (1−√x)2), and the χ2-divergence (f(x) = (x− 1)2). For us,
the most important property of f -divergencies is that they imply Jeffrey conditionalisation. (See also Diaconis
& Zabell (1982).)
Proposition 3 (Jeffrey Conditionalisation) Let P be the prior probability distribution over the binary
propositional variables H and E. The agent then learns that the probability of E shifts from P (E) to
Q(E). Minimising the f -divergence between Q and P , the posterior probability of H is then given by
Q(H) = P (H|E)Q(E) + P (H|¬E)Q(¬E).
Thus, in situations where the learned constraint on the posterior distribution is just the probability of a
proposition (i.e. in the cases described by standard Bayesian updating), minimising the f -divergence between
the prior and posterior distributions is equivalent to updating by (Jeffrey) conditionalisation. More pertinently,
an epistemically conservative agent who formalises conservativity by means of an f -divergence will always
reason in accordance with Jeffrey conditionalisation, and f -divergences can be seen as providing the formal
resources needed to apply the norm of epistemic conservativity in a way that is continuous with the norms of
standard Bayesian epistemology.
3.2 Learning Conditionals by Minimising f-Divergences
Returning to the central question of this paper, we now consider the implications of the preceding discussion
for the problem of learning indicative conditionals. The first important observation is given by the following
corollary of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1 (Simple Conditional – f-Divergence) An agent considers the propositions A and B and has
a prior probability distribution P according to eqs. (3) (with 0 < a, p, q < 1) defined over the corresponding
propositional variables. The agent then learns A→ B which imposes the constraint Q(B|A) = 1 on the poste-
rior distribution Q. Minimising the f -divergence between Q and P then implies that the posterior probability
distribution Q is exactly the same as in eqs. (4).
Conditionalising on the material conditional yields exactly the same result as minimising any f -divergence
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(including the inverse KL divergence) with the relevant extreme conditional probability constraint. So the
norm of epistemic conservativity (formalised in terms of f -divergence minimisation) yields the standard update
procedure for learning strict conditionals.15
For non-strict conditionals, the situation is of course significantly more complicated. To illustrate, we
consider the simple situation where an agent entertains the propositions A and B. She then learns the indicative
conditional A→ B. This, however, does not prompt her to increase the conditional probability of B given A
to 1 (since the conditional is non-strict), but only to some value p′ > P (B|A). She increases the conditional
probability, but not to its maximal value. We assume that her prior beliefs P are represented by the probability
distribution given in eqs. (3) and that the posterior probability distribution Q can be parameterized in the
same way, i.e.
Q(A,B) = a′ p′ , Q(A,¬B) = a′ p′
Q(¬A,B) = a′ q′ , Q(¬A,¬B) = a′ q′ . (7)
The posterior probability distribution is then given by the following proposition:
Proposition 4 (Simple Conditional – Non-Extreme f-Divergence) An agent considers the proposi-
tions A and B and has a prior probability distribution P according to eqs. (3) (with 0 < a, p, q < 1) defined
over the corresponding propositional variables. The agent then learns A→ B which imposes the constraint
Q(B|A) = p′ < 1 on the posterior distribution Q (see eq. (7))). Minimising the f -divergence between Q and P
then implies that q′ = q and a′ = a/(a+a · l) where the value of the likelihood ratio l depends on the particular
f -divergence. More specifically, we obtain
lIKL = 1 , lKL =
(
p′
p
)p′ (
p′
p
)p′
lH =
1(√
p p′ +
√
p p′
)2 , lχ2 = p′2p + p′
2
p
.
Furthermore, P ′(B) = P (B) + [(p′ − p)− a (l − 1) (p− q)] ·P ′(A) can be smaller than, equal to, or larger than
P (B), depending on the prior distribution.
Proposition 4 gives a powerful general characterisation of the update obtained by minimising an f -
divergence to a non-extreme conditional probability constraint. It also has important ramifications for the
15Note that this observation implies that in the sundowners and ski trip examples, minimising an f -divergence to the constraints
Ski1/Ski2 and Sun1/Sun2 respectively will yield the same updates as those we obtained in the previous section using standard
Bayesian conditionalisation. See also Appendix B.
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analysis of van Fraassen’s Judy Benjamin example, as we will now show.
4 Judy Benjamin Reloaded
Recall the Judy Benjamin example from the beginning of the previous section. In the literature, three main
criteria have been forwarded as general constraints on Judy’s response to the learned conditional. In order
to state these criteria, we introduce two binary propositional variables. The variable R has the values R:
“Judy lands in Red Territory”, and ¬R: “Judy lands in Blue Territory”. The variable S has the values S:
“Judy lands in the Second Company Area”, and ¬S: “Judy lands in Headquarters Area”. P and Q represent
Judy’s prior and posterior beliefs, respectively (where it is assumed that P is a uniform distribution over the
partition {R ∧ S,R ∧ ¬S,¬R ∧ S,¬R ∧ ¬S}).
JB1: Q(S|R) = 3/4 (and hence Q(¬S|R) = 1/4).
JB2: Q(A|X) = P (A|X) for any A and for any X ∈ {R ∧ S,R ∧ ¬S,¬R}.
JB3: Q(R) = P (R) = 1/2.
JB1 simply requires that Judy updates her beliefs to take into account the content of the learned condi-
tional. JB2 stipulates that Judy shouldn’t change any conditional degrees of belief other than P (S|R) and
P (¬S|R) (since the learned information doesn’t seem to tell her anything about the corresponding conditional
probabilities). JB3 requires that Judy shouldn’t change her degree of belief in R, i.e. she shouldn’t become
more or less confident that she is in Red Territory than she was before she learned the conditional (again, since
the learned information doesn’t seem to tell her anything about whether or not she is in Red Territory).16
Now, van Fraassen (1981) initially presented the Judy Benjamin example as a test case for the proposal
that rational agents should always update their credences by minimising the Kullback leibler (KL) divergence
between their prior and posterior degrees of belief (this is sometimes referred to as the ‘infomin principle’).
He noted that this proposal has two powerful motivations, namely:
(1) Minimising the KL divergence implies conditionalisation and Jeffrey conditionalisation when the learning
experience concerns the probability of a truth-functional proposition.
(2) Minimising the KL divergence yields an intuitively conservative update.
16Note that the kind of learning described by the Judy Benjamin example clearly cannot be properly modeled by Jeffrey
conditionalising to set the probability of the material conditional R ⊃ S to a new value. To see why, imagine that Judy rather
learns the conditional “If you are in Red Territory, then the odds that you are in the Second Company Area are 50 : 50.”
Since her prior beliefs already satisfied the equality P (S|R) = 1/2, it seems that she has not really learned anything new and
so has no reason to change her beliefs. However, if she Jeffrey conditionalises to set Q(R ⊃ S) = 1/2, her degrees of belief will
change significantly (since P (R ⊃ S) 6= 1/2). This intuitively irrational response can be avoided if she rather minimises a distance
measure to the learned conditional probability constraint.
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However, he also noted that, despite these appealing properties, the proposal yields an unintuitive update
in the Judy Benjamin case.17 Specifically, if Judy updates by minimising the KL divergence to the constraint
Q(S|R) = 3/4, her posterior credences will violate the JB3 criterion, i.e. her confidence that she is in Red
Territory will decrease across the update. And this seems problematic since the learned conditional didn’t
seem to tell her anything about whether or not she was in Red Territory. Rather, the learned conditional
only told her what she should expect under the supposition that she in Red Territory. Thus, it has been
widely claimed that the Judy Benjamin example is a major problem for those that advocate minimising the
KL divergence as a fully general updating procedure.
van Fraassen et al. (1986) provide an alternative analysis of the example. Specifically, they consider an
amended version of the example in which Judy learns that the conditional probability of S given R is 1 (rather
than 3/4), i.e. the learned conditional is strict.18 They note that in this extreme version of the example, it
seems natural for Judy to reduce her belief in R. For, the learned information is equivalent to the proposition
¬(R ∧ ¬S) = R ⊃ S, and conditionalising on that proposition will lead to a decrease in the probability of R
(by Proposition 1). Now, there is nothing ostensibly ‘special’ about the learned odds in this case (1 : 0) as
compared to those learned in the standard version of the example (3 : 1). So, the story goes, there is no reason
to think that Judy can rationally decrease her belief in R in one case but not the other. Thus, we should drop
the requirement that Judy’s confidence in R stays fixed across the update.
But even if this response is correct and JB3 is not a genuine rationality constraint (we discuss this response
in more detail in Section 6), van Fraassen et al. (1986) note that there is another more fundamental problem
for advocates of KL minimisation. In particular, they present two alternative probabilistic distance measures
such that (i) updating by minimising those measures yields Jeffrey conditionalisation, (ii) all three measures
look like equally good formalisations of epistemic conservativity, and (iii) all three measures yield different
updates in the Judy Benjamin example. The problem is that there doesn’t seem to be any principled ground for
choosing between the alternative distance measures, and hence that it’s unclear why Judy should minimise the
KL divergence instead of some other probability distance measure. Again, the norm of epistemic conservativity
is not sufficiently precise to provide concrete guidance to epistemic agents.
It is immediately clear that the analysis provided by van Fraassen (1981) and van Fraassen et al. (1986) can
be greatly generalised and refined in light of the results described in the previous section. Firstly, we know that
all f -divergences (of which there are infinitely many) yield update procedures which are equivalent to Jeffrey
17Vasudevan (2018) presents an alternative rationale for updating by the KL divergence in the Judy Benjamin example.
Specifically, he does not invoke any kind of conservativity norm, but rather argues that minimising the KL divergence is justified
by the assumption that the informant’s report omits no relevant information. For the purposes of this paper, we intend to focus
on clarifying the relationship between the Judy Benjamin problem and norms of epistemic conservativity, although we think that
additional epistemic principles such as that invoked by Vasudevan (2018) may also have an important role to play.
18This extreme version of the example is also considered by Bovens (2013), who similarly reaches the conclusion that Judy’s
credence in R should change across the update. However, this analysis is subsequently retracted in Bovens & Ferreira (2013).
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conditionalisation when the learned information concerns the probability of a truth functional proposition,
and we also know from Proposition 4 that the the resultant updates will generally all be different. Thus, the
degree to which the rational update in the Judy Benjamin example is underdetermined is far greater than has
previously been acknowledged. There are infinitely many update procedures that are both compatible with
Jeffrey conditionalisation and intuitively conservative, and there’s no obvious reason why Judy should prefer
any one of them to any other. Or is there?
Recall Proposition 4, which shows that minimising the f -divergence to the constraint Q(S|R) = 3/4 will
typically (excluding limit cases) lead to an update that violates JB3, with one prominent exception, namely
the inverse KL divergence (IKL). Minimising the IKL divergence to a non-extreme conditional probability
constraint will always leave the prior probability of the antecedent unchanged. This means that minimising
the IKL divergence is the only way for Judy to satisfy all three criteria JB1–JB3 whilst being epistemically
conservative and updating in a way that is consistent with Jeffrey conditionalisation. So if, contra van
Fraassen et al. (1986), we accept the normative force of JB3, we are forced to conclude that minimising the
IKL divergence is the rational solution to the Judy Benjamin problem. At first blush, this looks like an
appealing solution to the problem. The IKL divergence appears to provide an update procedure that satisfies
both of the main motivations that van Fraassen cites in favour of the KL divergence, and is also the only
such update procedure that recommends what many consider to be the rational update in the Judy Benjamin
example. The solution proposed by Douven & Romeijn (2012) is actually equivalent to minimising the IKL
divergence (although they don’t identify the important fact that the IKL divergence is an f -divergence that
produces an update that is continuous with Jeffrey conditionalisation). However, Douven and Romeijn stop
short of endorsing the minimisation of the IKL divergence as a generally applicable update strategy.19 They
eventually suggest that no single distance measure/update procedure is suitable for all learning scenarios, and
tentatively advocate a kind of contextualism about update rules.
Here, we attempt to identify a single update procedure that provides a uniquely rational response to any
given learning scenario. However, we think that the normative justification for such a procedure must be more
general and philosophically principled than the simple observation that it yields what some take to be the
rational update in the Judy Benjamin problem. The simple fact that the IKL divergence defines an update
that satisfies JB3 does not constitute a serious argument in favour of using that distance measure in all cases
of non-propositional learning.20 For, we have already seen that some authors (e.g. van Fraassen et al. (1986))
question whether JB3 should even be accepted as a rationality constraint in the first place. Furthermore, as
19This is already clear from the fact that they don’t think that rational agents should conditionalise on the material conditional
in the extreme version of the example where the learned constraint is strict, i.e. Q(S|R) = 1.
20By non-propositional learning, we mean learning experiences such as Judy Benjamin’s, in which the newly acquired evidence
can’t be adequately represented by a constraint on the probability of any one truth functional proposition.
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we will see in the Section 6, it is possible to construct analogous examples in which it seems intuitive that
the agent’s credence in the antecedent of the learned non-strict conditional should change, and in these cases
the IKL divergence is guaranteed to give what looks like the wrong answer. We need a principled and context
independent way of deciding between alternative f -divergences that can subsequently be used to cast light on
problematic learning scenarios such as that described in the Judy Benjamin example.
We turn now to giving a general normative argument for a single, universally applicable update procedure
based on the minimisation of an f -divergence. In Section 6, we consider the implications of this argument for
the analysis of the Judy Benjamin example.
5 Accuracy and Conservativity
One natural approach to trying to decide between alternative f -divergences is to employ considerations from
epistemic utility theory. In recent years, a number of authors have attempted to utilise the notion of ‘epistemic
utility’ or ‘accuracy’ to provide purely epistemic justifications for the basic norms of Bayesian epistemology,
including probabilism (Leitgeb & Pettigrew (2010)) and conditionalisation (Greaves & Wallace (2006)). One
might hope that a similar justification can be given for a particular f -divergence, in which case we would be
furnished with a unique rational update procedure in Judy Benjamin style cases.21
Recall that the central idea behind epistemic utility theory is that epistemic agents should aim to ap-
proximate the truth with their degrees of belief or, in other words, that they should aim to minimise their
inaccuracy. It is standardly assumed that the right way to quantify the inaccuracy of an agent’s partial beliefs
is to employ a strictly proper scoring rule, i.e. a measure of inaccuracy which ensures that agents always
expect their own partial beliefs to uniquely minimise inaccuracy. Two of the most important and widely
defended proper scoring rules are the Brier and logarithmic scoring rules, defined below (where W is the set
of possible worlds).
• The logarithmic scoring rule is the rule which defines the inaccuracy of the credence function P at a
world w ∈W by IL(P,w) = − ln(P (w)).
• The Brier score is the rule which defines the inaccuracy of the credence function P at a world w ∈ W
by IB(P,w) = (1− P (w))2 +
∑
w′ 6=w
P (w′)2.
Now, it is well known that all strictly proper scoring rules, including IL and IB , can be used to define
a corresponding divergence measure, as we will soon show. Specifically, given a strictly proper scoring rule
21In what follows we assume a basic familiarity with epistemic utility theory. For a book-length introduction to the subject,
see Pettigrew (2016).
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IS and any two credence functions P and Q, we can define expS(Q|P ) :=
∑
w∈W P (W ) · IS(Q,w), which
encodes the extent to which an agent whose credences are given by P will expect the credences given by Q
to be inaccurate. By strict propriety, expS(Q|P ) is uniquely minimised when Q = P . Leitgeb & Pettigrew
(2010) utilise the notion of ‘expected inaccuracy’ to articulate the following epistemic norm.
Diachronic Accuracy Norm: Suppose that at time t1 an agent’s prior credences are embodied by the
probability distribution P , and that between times t1 and t2, she learns new information which imposes
a constraint C on her posterior credences at time t2. Then at time t2 the agent should adopt credences
encoded by a probability distribution Q such that (i) Q satisfies C, and (ii) for any Q′ that satisfies C,
expS(Q|P ) ≤ expS(Q′|P ), where IS is one’s chosen proper scoring rule, i.e. Q should minimise expected
inaccuracy (from the perspective of the agent’s prior beliefs) amongst the class of possible probability functions
that satisfy the learned constraint C.
The basic idea here is that when you update to take into account the new evidence, you should do so
in the way that you expect to result in the most accurate posterior beliefs. In particular, the Diachronic
Accuracy Norm requires agents to adopt the posterior probability distribution Q that minimises the quantity
DS(P,Q) = expS(Q|P ) − expS(P |P ). When IS = IB , this quantity is just the square Euclidean distance
between P and Q, as discussed in Section 3. When IS = IL, expS(Q|P ) − expS(P |P ) is equal to the KL
divergence between P and Q, or the IKL divergence between Q and P .22 Now, we already know that the IKL
divergence is an example of an f -divergence, so by trying to minimise expected inaccuracy as measured by
the logarithmic scoring rule, we will end up minimising an f -divergence (the IKL divergence) to the learned
constraint, which is exactly the learning procedure advocated in this paper. And this is where things get
interesting. For, the following two facts have been established in the statistics literature (assuming that the
sample space is finite):
1. For any strictly proper scoring rule IS , the divergence measure defined by D(P,Q) := expS(Q|P ) −
expS(P |P ) is an example of a ‘Bregmann divergence’ (Gneiting & Raftery (2007)).
2. The KL divergence is the only element of the intersection of the set of Bregman divergences and the set
of f -divergences (Amari (2009)).
Thus, if we assume that DS(P,Q) is equal to an f -divergence between P and Q, then that f -divergence
must be the KL divergence. So the only way to minimise expected inaccuracy whilst minimising an f -
divergence between P and Q is to minimise the KL divergence between P and Q, i.e. to minimise the IKL
divergence between Q and P . In contrast, it is easily seen that minimising the KL divergence between Q and
22We are very grateful and indebted to Randall McCutcheon for correcting an error at this point in a previous version of this
manuscript
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P does not minimise expected inaccuracy for any strictly proper scoring rule. For, if DS(P,Q) were equal to
KL(Q,P ), that would imply that DS(P,Q) was equal to IKL(P,Q), which can’t be the case since IKL is not a
Bregman divergence. So the IKL divergence has the very special property of being an f -divergence such that
minimising the divergence from Q to P minimises expected inaccuracy according to a strictly proper scoring
rule (the log rule). We’ve seen that assuming conservativity and Jeffrey conditionalisation as basic epistemic
norms motivates adopting an update procedure defined by the minimisation of an f -divergence. However,
there are many alternative f -divergences, all of which define different updating strategies. We need extra
normative principles if we hope to overcome this underdetermination. We’ve now seen that the Diachronic
Accuracy Norm is enough to break the deadlock and identify the minimisation of the IKL divergence between
Q and P as a normatively privileged rational updating procedure, since unlike i.e. the KL divergence, it is
an f -divergence that minimises expected inaccuracy according to a strictly proper scoring rule. For those
readers that prefer to think in terms of the KL divergence, we stress that this update procedure is equivalent
to minimising the KL divergence between P and Q.23
Before moving on, it is worth pausing briefly to note that the preceding argument might be considered
problematic by those that advocate quantifying epistemic utility by means of a scoring rule other than the
log rule. For, the IKL divergence only minimises expected inaccuracy when the agent in question identifies
inaccuracy with epistemic disutility as measured by IL. And if one does not consider this conception of
epistemic disutility to be plausible, then perhaps the argument will be less than entirely convincing. We have
a couple of responses to these concerns. Firstly, we reiterate that the following two norms are widely accepted
in the literature: (i) agents should employ update rules that are compatible with Jeffrey conditionalisation,
and (ii) agents should always aim to minimise their expected accuracy as measured by a strictly proper scoring
rule. And it is a mathematical theorem that these two norms can be satisfied in full generality if one adopts
the updating rule that says ‘minimise the Inverse Kullback Leibler divergence between your posterior and prior
distributions (relative to the constraints given by the learning experience)’. The argument itself does not assert
the superiority of the logarithmic scoring rule as a premise. Rather, it shows that if an agent wants to abide
by two plausible norms relating to updating and epistemic utility, then they have good reason to conceive of
epistemic utility in terms of the log rule. The argument does not rely on the admittedly controversial claim
that the log rule encodes the most plausible conception of epistemic utility. Rather, it constitutes a new and
compelling piece of evidence in support of that claim. Secondly, it should be noted that although the log
score certainly has its critics, it is by no means universally rejected, and it is still very much a part of the very
much open debate surrounding the proper formalisation of epistemic utility (see e.g. Fallis and Lewis (2016),
23Throughout the paper, we try to follow the common convention of minimising the divergence between Q and P , rather than
between P and Q. For this reason, we talk in terms of minimising the IKL divergence between Q and P , rather than minimising
the KL divergence between P and Q.
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Levinstein (2017)). Thus, the fact that the conclusion of the argument seems to count in support of the log
rule certainly shouldn’t be considered a straightforward reductio against the premises.
6 Updating, Interpreting and Learning
Recall that van Fraassen et al. (1986) rejected JB3 as a constraint on prospective solutions to the Judy
Benjamin example and viewed the upshot of that example to be that we need additional grounds for choosing
between rival probabilistic distance measures. We’ve shown that the Diachronic Accuracy Norm allows us to
solve this problem and identify minimising the IKL divergence as a normatively privileged update procedure
for epistemically conservative Bayesian agents. In fact, this argument has the extra payoff that it vindicates
the common intuition that it is irrational for Judy to change her credence in R after learning Q(S|R) = 3/4
(since minimising IKL ensures that her prior credence in R remains unchanged). It is interesting to recall that
minimising any well known f -divergence other than IKL to the constraint Q(S|R) = 3/4 would cause Judy to
change her credence in R. But there is an alternative way to ensure that JB3 is satisfied without employing
the IKL divergence. Specifically, we could impose JB3 as an additional constraint on the update, so that Judy
now interprets the content of the learned evidence not just by the constraint Q(S|R) = 3/4, but rather by the
dual constraints that Q(S|R) = 3/4 and Q(R) = 1/2 = P (R). If we do that, then we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 5 (Simple Conditional – Non-Extreme f-Divergence+) An agent considers the proposi-
tions A and B and has a prior probability distribution P according to eqs. (3) (with 0 < a, p, q < 1) defined
over the corresponding propositional varables. The agent then learns A→ B which imposes the constraints
Q(B|A) = p′ < 1 and Q(A) = P (A) on the new distribution Q (see eq. (7))). Minimising any f -divergence
between Q and P will result in the same posterior distribution as that which results from minimising the IKL
divergence with the sole constraint that Q(B|A) = p′ < 1.
Proposition 5 tells us that if Judy updates by minimising an f -divergence to the dual constraints that
Q(S|R) = 3/4 and Q(R) = 1/2 = P (R), she will end up with the same credences that she would have had if
she had rather updated by minimising the IKL divergence to the sole constraint that Q(S|R) = 3/4. Imposing
JB3 as an additional constraint on the update completely eliminates the underdetermination of the rational
update procedure. Importantly, this demonstrates that it is possible to obtain the solution to the Judy
Benjamin problem forwarded by Douven & Romeijn (2012) (and independently justified by the Diachronic
Accuracy Norm) by simply accepting JB3 as part of the content of Judy’s evidence. And in the standard
version of the example, it seems that there is a case for claiming that JB3 is indeed part of what Judy learns.
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For, before informing Judy that Q(S|R) = 3/4, the radio operator explicitly states that ‘I can’t be sure where
you are’, which may be interpreted as telling Judy that she should remain agnostic about whether or not she’s
in Red Territory. However, one could remove this sentence from the example and it seems likely that many
would have a strong intuition that Judy’s credence in R should remain fixed, since the constraint Q(S|R) = 3/4
itself doesn’t tell us anything definite about the probability of R being true. So why should Judy accept JB3
as part of the content of the learned conditional? To answer this question, it is useful to consider the following
examples, which generalize the Judy Benjamin example in an illuminating way.
Lena the Scientist Example. Lena is considering a set of mutually exclusive (but not logically exhaustive)
scientific hypotheses H1, . . . ,Hn and their relationship to a possible future experimental outcome E.
Conditional on any of the Hi’s, E has a low probability of being observed.
Case 1: Based on previous experience, Lena strongly believes that E will in fact be observed. In light
of the fact that all of the considered theories conflict with this belief (since P (E|Hi) is low for all
i), she thinks that all of the considered theories are probably false, and a new theory is needed.
However, one of her research assistants then informs her that the probability of E conditioned on
H1 was previously miscalculated, and is actually very high, i.e. Lena learns the conditional ‘If
H1 then probably E’. Delighted to learn that one of her theories gives reasonable predictions of
future experiments, Lena increases both the conditional probability of E given H1 and the overall
probability of H1.
Case 2: Based on previous experience, Lena strongly believes that E will not be observed. She is
satisfied that all of the candidate theories cohere with this belief. However, one of her research
assistants then informs her that the probability of E conditioned on H1 was previously miscalculated,
and is actually very high, i.e. Lena learns the conditional ‘If H1 then probably E’. As well as
increasing the conditional probability of E given H1, Lena also dramatically reduces her belief in
H1, since it now conflicts with her belief that E won’t be observed.
Case 3: Due to a lack of relevant evidence, Lena is agnostic about whether E will be observed. One of
her research assistants then informs her that the probability of E conditioned on H1 was previously
miscalculated, and is actually very high, i.e. Lena learns the conditional ‘If H1 then probably E’.
Lena increases the conditional probability of E given H1, but keeps the probability of H1 fixed,
since she is indifferent about whether E will be observed, and so doesn’t consider H1’s evidential
relationship to E to bear on its plausibility.24
24One might wonder whether Lena’s response in Cases 1 and 3 conflict with our defence of Proposition 1 in Section 2. There,
we argued that it is natural that upon learning a strict conditional, an agent should typically become less confident in the
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We take it that Lena’s responses to the learned conditional are intuitively rational in all three of these cases.
When she learns that H1 coheres better with her other beliefs than she’d previously thought, she becomes
more confident in its truth (Case 1). Conversely, when she learns that H1 conflicts with her existing beliefs,
she becomes more skeptical of its truth (Case 2). Finally, when the learned conditional has no implications for
H1’s relation to her other beliefs (as in the Judy Benjamin example), she does not have any reason to change
her belief in H1. We’ve already seen that Lena’s response in Case 3 can only be captured by minimising
the IKL divergence or, equivalently, minimising an arbitrary f -divergence with the additional constraint
that her credence in H1 remains fixed. And this coheres with our observation that the IKL divergence is
normatively privileged from the perspective of expected inaccuracy minimisation. But then cases 1 and 2
become problematic, since minimising the IKL divergence to ensure Q(E|H1) > P (E|H1) will always result in
the probability of H1 remaining fixed (Proposition 4), and in cases 1 and 2 it is intuitively rational for Lena
to increase and decrease her credence in H1, respectively.
25 Thus it seems that epistemically conservative
Bayesian agents are bound to deviate from the intuitively rational update in two of the three cases. This all
suggests the following general updating strategy for learning non-strict conditionals.
Non-Strict Conditionals Updating Strategy: An agent considers the propositions A and B and has
a prior probability distribution P according to eqs. (3) (with 0 < a, p, q < 1) defined over the corresponding
propositional variables. The agent then learns A→ B which imposes the constraint Q(B|A) = p′ > P (B|A)
(p′ < 1) on the posterior distribution Q (see eq. (7))). She will then update in one of three ways:
(1) If P (B) > 1/2, she will update by minimising the IKL divergence to the constraints (i) Q(B|A) = p′ and
(ii) Q(A) > P (A).
(2) If P (B) = 1/2, she will update by minimising the IKL divergence to the constraints (i) Q(B|A) = p′ and
(ii) Q(A) = P (A).
(3) If P (B) < 1/2, she will update by minimising the IKL divergence to the constraint (i) Q(B|A) = p′ and
(ii) Q(A) < P (A).
According to this strategy, the probabilistic constraints that are used to interpret the learned conditional
depend crucially on the prior beliefs of the agent. Whether the agent considers the learned conditional to
antecedent, since the learned conditional renders the antecedent more informative. However, the situation is different when the
learned conditional is non-strict, i.e. when the learned conditional probability constraint is non-extreme. For, in the strict case,
the extreme constraint actually rules out some of the worlds at which the antecedent is true. In the non-strict case, the constraint
does not rule out any worlds but merely shifts the distribution of the probability mass across the worlds where the antecedent is
true. There is no meaningful sense in which the antecedent becomes more informative in this case.
25The fact that some f -divergences will allow for an increase in the probability of the antecedent was pointed out to the
authors on the mathoverflow thread at http://tinyurl.com/mathoverflow1. The f -divergences that satisfy this property are
mathematically quite complex and have not been considered in the philosophical or psychological literature. Normatively, we
view these divergences as being on a par with all other f -divergences except for the IKL divergence.
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be evidence for, against or irrelevant to the antecedent will be determined by their prior credence in the
consequent. This updating strategy has a couple of key advantages. Firstly, it yields the intuitively rational
update in all of the Lena the scientist cases, and hence also in the Judy Benjamin example. Secondly, it
allows us to maintain the position that minimising the IKL divergence provides the rational update in all
learning scenarios. It is only the interpretation of the evidence that varies according to epistemic context.
Once the evidence has been interpreted in terms of concrete constraints on the posterior distribution, the
principles of Jeffrey conditionalisation, epistemic conservativity and the Diachronic Accuracy Norm jointly
identify minimising the IKL divergence as a normatively privileged rational update procedure. The main
philosophical upshot is that the evidential import of a learned conditional is partially determined by epistemic
context. In some sense, the agent has to make a choice about how to interpret the evidence.
A similar conclusion was ultimately reached by Douven & Romeijn (2012), who also thought that the
rational response to learning conditionals was partially determined by the agent’s prior belief state, and the
relative degrees to which their individual beliefs are ‘entrenched’. However, the nature of their contextualism
was of a fundamentally different sort to that advocated here. Specifically, they argued that the choice of
distance measure to be minimised should be determined by context, and advocated both the IKL divergence
and Hellinger distance as providing the rational responses to some learning scenarios. We contend that this
approach is unprincipled and overly vague because, as Douven and Romeijn acknowledge, it is completely
unclear exactly how one should go about choosing a particular distance measure for a given learning scenario
and epistemic context. Here, we’ve argued that epistemically conservative Bayesian agents should always up-
date by minimising the IKL divergence. There is no contextual relativity in terms of the rational probabilistic
update rule to apply relative to a set of definite constraints on the posterior. Rather, the contextual relativity
occurs only at the stage at which the agent interprets the learned conditional as a set of such constraints.
One possible objection to the proposed update strategy is that 1/2 is an arbitrary and artificial threshold
for determining the response to the learned conditional. An alternative approach would be to adopt a Lockean
theory of belief (see e.g. chapter 4 of Foley (2000), Leitgeb (2017)), according to which an agent believes a
proposition A if and only if P (A) is above some pre-determined threshold value t ∈ [1/2, 1], i.e. if and only
if the agent has a sufficiently high confidence in A. This would suggest the following variation of the update
strategy:
Lockean Non-Strict Conditionals Updating Strategy: An agent considers the propositions A and
B and has a prior probability distribution P according to eqs. (3) (with 0 < a, p, q < 1) defined over the
corresponding propositional variables. The agent then learns A→ B which imposes the constraint Q(B|A) =
p′ > P (B|A) (p′ < 1) on the posterior distribution Q (see eq. (7))). She will then update in one of three ways:
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(1) If P (B) ≥ t, she will update by minimising the IKL divergence to the constraints (i) Q(B|A) = p′ and
(ii) Q(A) > P (A).
(2) If P (B) ∈ (1− t, t), she will update by minimising the IKL divergence to the constraints (i) Q(B|A) = p′
and (ii) Q(A) = P (A).
(3) If P (B) ≤ 1− t, she will update by minimising the IKL divergence to the constraint (i) Q(B|A) = p′ and
(ii) Q(A) < P (A).
The Lockean update strategy is equivalent to the original strategy in the special limiting case where
t = 1/2. But it is widely acknowledged that a threshold of 1/2 provides an overly permissive characterisation
of the notion of belief (it seems unnatural to say that you believe that a coin with bias of 0.501 will land
heads). When t > 1/2, the Lockean strategy instructs agents to increase (decrease) the probability of the
antecedent if they have a prior belief in the consequent (the negation of the consequent). Again, the motivation
is that when an agent learns a non-strict conditional A→ B, they should change their belief in A depending
on whether the relevant conditional probability constraint makes A cohere better or worse with their prior
beliefs. It is easy to see the Lockean strategy has all the same virtues as the standard strategy (of which it is
a generalisation). The problem of choosing an appropriate threshold value t is of course a deep one that goes
significantly beyond the scope of this paper (see e.g. Fitelson & Shear (forthcoming)).
7 Conclusion
According to the position defended here, an agent can never simply update on a non-extreme conditional
probability constraint such as Q(S|R) = 3/4. Before updating on such a constraint, they need to consider
how the new information relates to their prior beliefs, and use that consideration to determine whether what
they’ve learned bears meaningfully on the plausibility of the conditioning event (and if so, in what way).
Once they’ve gone through this pre-processing step, the epistemic norms described above will compel them
to update by minimising the IKL divergence to the set of posterior distributions satisfying the resulting set of
constraints (which will consist of the original conditional probability constraint and an additional constraint
on the probability of the antecedent). The idea that agents need to go through this complex process of
interpretation and updating is motivated primarily by the fact that no simple updating rule or distance-
minimisation procedure is capable of giving the intuitively correct verdict in all of the relevant thought
experiments. But of course, intuitions may differ from person to person, and one could simply reject what
we take to be the intuitive solution to the Lena the Scientist cases. Whether this is an acceptable approach
would seem to depend largely on the strength and uniformity of the intuitions it violates. One could turn
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to the psychology of reasoning in order to gain more definite insights here. In recent years, there has been
much empirical work analyzing the outcomes of dynamic conditional reasoning experiments in terms of the
minimisation of the KL divergence (see e.g. Singmann et al. (2016), Ali et al. (2011)). If it were the case that
the Lockean updating strategy described above provided a significantly better account of people’s reasoning
habits than simple KL divergence minimisation (which already performs quite well), that would suggest that
the intuitions behind these thought experiments are quite deeply rooted, and hence that violating them would
incur a high theoretical cost. Conversely, if it turned out that these intuitions weren’t found to play a key role
in people’s reasoning habits, that would suggest that nothing substantial is lost if we rather advocate simply
minimising a fixed f -divergence (such as the IKL divergence) to the given conditional probability constraint in
every case. Whether or not one takes the Lockean updating strategy to be necessary will, we suspect, depend
crucially on one’s position on fundamental issues of philosophical methodology regarding i.e. how seriously to
take common philosophical intuitions and the normative significance of people’s actual reasoning habits. For
now, we remain agnostic about these wider issues and are content to have presented an updating strategy that
is consistent with foundational Bayesian norms and chimes well with pre-theoretic intuitions. If one considers
these intuitions to be unimportant, then of course it is possible to disregard this more complex procedure in
favour of simply minimising the IKL divergence to the relevant conditional probability constraint.
We have also highlighted the previously unrecognized fact that minimising the IKL divergence between
Q and P seems to be the only way to generalize Bayesian updating methods to non-propositional learning
scenarios in a manner that (1) is intuitively conservative, and (2) minimises expected inaccuracy as measured
by a strictly proper scoring rule. This shows, contra van Fraassen et al. (1986), that it is possible to identify a
normatively privileged formalisation of epistemic conservativity. In response to our arguments, one might also
take it to be significant that minimising the KL divergence between Q and P has been shown to provide a good
account of people’s actual reasoning patterns in dynamic conditional inference tasks. However, the possibility
of using alternative f -divergences to describe people’s reasoning patterns is a new one that has not yet been
seriously explored. If it turns out that other f -divergences provide a better fit to people’s actual reasoning
habits than the IKL divergence does, that could be taken to show that humans don’t generally reason in a
way that minimises expected inaccuracy. Again, whether or not one would interpret such a result as being
normatively significant is likely to depend on one’s stance regarding the prospects of naturalistic epistemology
and the extent to which one views normative epistemology as having a duty to vindicate everyday reasoning
practices (see e.g. Bishop and Trout (2005)). More generally, it is clear that the arguments presented here
open a new frontier at the interface of the psychology of reasoning and normative Bayesian epistemology.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proposition 1
We first compute the posterior distribution from eqs. (4). We begin with
P (¬A ∨ B) = P (¬A) + P (B)− P (¬A,B)
= a+ a p+ a q − a q
= a p+ a. (8)
Next, we compute
P ∗(A,B) = P (A,B|¬A ∨ B) = P (A,B)
P (¬A ∨ B) =
a p
a p+ a
P ∗(A,¬B) = P (A,¬B|¬A ∨ B) = 0
P ∗(¬A,B) = P (¬A,B|¬A ∨ B) = P (¬A,B)
P (¬A ∨ B) =
a q
a p+ a
(9)
P ∗(¬A,¬B) = P (¬A,¬B|¬A ∨ B) = P (¬A,¬B)
P (¬A ∨ B) =
a q
a p+ a
.
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We can now calculate
P ∗(A) = P ∗(A,B) + P ∗(A,¬B) = a p
a p+ a
= a− a a p
a p+ a
< a
P ∗(B) = P ∗(A,B) + P ∗(¬A,B) = a p+ a q
a p+ a
=
P (B)
a p+ a
> P (B).
A.2 Proposition 2
P ∗(R) = P (R|¬R ∨ ¬S,D)
=
P (R,¬R ∨ ¬S,D)
P (¬R ∨ ¬S,D)
=
P (R,¬S,D)
P (R¬S,D) + P (¬R,S,D) + P (¬R¬S,D)
=
P (R,¬S,D)
P (R¬S,D) + P (¬R,D) (10)
Using eq. (6), we note that P (R,¬S,D) = P (¬S|R,D)P (R,D) = P (R,D). Hence,
P ∗(R) =
P (R,D)
P (R,D) + P (¬R,D) . (11)
Finally, we use the fact that R and D are probabilistically independent and obtain
P ∗(R) =
P (R)P (D)
P (R)P (D) + P (¬R)P (D)
= P (R).
A.3 Proposition 3
P and Q are given by Table 1 and we set Q(E) = e′. Q satisfies the following two constraints:
H E P Q
1 1 p1 q1
1 0 p2 q2
0 1 p3 q3
0 0 p4 q4
Table 1: The probability distributions P and Q
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q1 + q3 = e
′ (12)
q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 = 1 (13)
Hence, we have to minimise
L =
4∑
i=1
pi f(qi/pi) + λ(q1 + q3 − e′) + µ(q1 + q2 + q3 + q4 − 1). (14)
To do so, we differentiate by qk and obtain
∂L
∂q1
= f ′(q1/p1) + λ+ µ = 0 ,
∂L
∂q3
= f ′(q3/p3) + λ+ µ = 0 (15)
∂L
∂q2
= f ′(q2/p2) + µ = 0 ,
∂L
∂q2
= f ′(q4/p4) + µ = 0. (16)
Eqs. (15) imply that
q1 = αp1 , q3 = αp3. (17)
Similarly, eqs. (16) imply that
q2 = β p2 , q4 = β p4. (18)
We insert eqs. (17) into eq. (12) and obtain
α =
e′
p1 + p3
. (19)
Next, we insert eqs. (17), (18) and (19) into eq. (13) and obtain
β =
e′
p2 + p4
. (20)
Hence,
Q(H) = q1 + q2
=
p1
p1 + p3
e′ +
p2
p2 + p4
e′
= P (H|E)Q(E) + P (H|¬E)Q(¬E).
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A.4 Corollary 1
Following our discussion in Section 2, the agent learns the material conditional A ⊃ B with certainty. We can
then use conditonalization (which is a special case of Jeffrey conditionalisation from Proposition 3) and obtain
the same result as in Proposition 1.
A.5 Proposition 4
To find a′ and q′, we compute the f -divergence between Q and P ,
F = a p f
(
a′ p′
a p
)
+ a p f
(
a′ p′
a p
)
+ a q f
(
a′ q′
a q
)
+ a q f
(
a′ q′
a q
)
. (21)
To find the minimum of F , we first differentiate F by q′ and set the resulting expression equal to zero. Hence,
a′
[
f ′
(
a′ q′
a q
)
− f ′
(
a′ q′
a q
)]
= 0. (22)
The convexity of f then implies that q′ = q. Inserting this into eq. (26) yields
F = a p f
(
a′ p′
a p
)
+ a p f
(
a′ p′
a p
)
+ a f
(
a′
a
)
. (23)
To find a′, we differentiate this expression by a′ and set the resulting expression equal to zero and obtain
p′ f ′
(
a′ p′
a p
)
+ p′ f ′
(
a′ p′
a p
)
= f ′
(
a′
a
)
. (24)
This equation cannot be solved in full generality. The result will depend on the specific form of convex function
f . In all cases considered here, eq. (24) simplifies to an expression of the form
a′ a
a′ a
=
1
l
, (25)
with the likelihood ratio l. Hence, a′ = a/(a+a l). For the IKL divergence, we have f(x) = − log x and hence
f ′(x) = −1/x. Inserting this into eq. (24) then yields l = 1 and therefore a′ = a. (Note that this result only
holds for p′ < 1. See Proposition 1.) The results for the other f -divergencies obtain accordingly.
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Finally, we calculate
P ′(B)− P (B) = a′ p′ + a′ q − a p− a q
=
1
a+ a l
· [a p+ a (p′ − p) + a l q − (a+ a l)(a p+ a q)]
=
1
a+ a l
· [a a p+ a (p′ − p) + a a l q − a a q − a a l p]
=
a
a+ a l
· [(p′ − p)− a (l − 1) (p− q)]
= [(p′ − p)− a (l − 1) (p− q)] · P ′(A),
from which the statement in the proposition follows.
A.6 Proposition 5
We follow the same procedure as in the proof of Proposition 4. Noting the additional constraint Q(A) = P (A)
(i.e. a′ = a), the f -divergence between Q and P is given by
F = a p f
(
p′
p
)
+ a p f
(
p′
p
)
+ a q f
(
q′
q
)
+ a q f
(
q′
q
)
. (26)
To find the minimum of F and to determine the value of the only free parameter (i.e. q′), we differentiate F
by q′ and set the resulting expression equal to zero. Hence,
a
[
f ′
(
q′
q
)
− f ′
(
q′
q
)]
= 0. (27)
The convexity of f then implies that q′ = q.
Comparing this result with the results for the IKL reported in Proposition 4, we find that the corresponding
posterior probability distributions are the same.
B The Ski Trip Example
We consider the three propositional variables E,S and B mentioned above. P denotes the prior probability
distribution, P ∗ denotes the posterior probability distribution after learning Ski1 and Ski2 via conditionali-
sation, and Q denotes the posterior probability distribution that one obtains after minimising a f -divergence
between Q and P taking the constraints implied by Ski1 and Ski2 into account. See Table 2.
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E S B P P ∗ Q
1 1 1 p1 p
∗
1 q1
1 1 0 p2 p
∗
2 q2
1 0 1 p3 p
∗
3 q3
1 0 0 p4 p
∗
4 q4
0 1 1 p5 p
∗
5 q5
0 1 0 p6 p
∗
6 q6
0 0 1 p7 p
∗
7 q7
0 0 0 p8 p
∗
8 q8
Table 2: The probability distributions P, P ∗ and Q for the ski trip example
B.1 Conditionalisation
To determine the posterior distribution P ∗, we apply Bayesian conditionalisation on the two new pieces of
information. As P (·, ·,¬B|·,B) = 0, one sees immediately that p∗2 = p∗4 = p∗6 = p∗8 = 0. Furthermore,
P (E,¬S, ·|¬E ∨ S, ·) = 0. Hence, also p∗3 = 0. This leaves us with the computation of
p∗1 := P (E,S,B|¬E ∨ S,B) =
P (E,S,B)
P (¬E ∨ S,B) =
p1
p1 + p5 + p7
p∗5 := P (¬E,S,B|¬E ∨ S,B) =
P (¬E,S,B)
P (¬E ∨ S,B) =
p5
p1 + p5 + p7
(28)
p∗7 := P (¬E,¬S,B|¬E ∨ S,B) =
P (¬E,¬S,B)
P (¬E ∨ S,B) =
p7
p1 + p5 + p7
.
Hence, P ∗(E) = p∗1. Note further that P (E) = p1 + p2 + p3 + p4. Hence, P
∗(E) > P (E) iff p1 > (p1 + p2 +
p3 + p4)(p1 + p5 + p7). As P (E) is small, this condition holds if p5 and p7 are small (as mentioned above).
To get a more intuitive understanding of the example, we make a plausible additional assumption about
Harry’s prior beliefs, namely that he considers the variables B and E to be probabilistically independent given
S, i.e. P (B|E,S) = P (B|S). Intuitively, this means that Harry only considers E to be evidentially relevant to
B to the extent that it counts as evidence for S. Whether or not Sue passes the exam is only probabilistically
relevant to whether or not she buys a new ski outfit when we do not know whether or not she is going on
a ski trip. Sue’s passing the exam is only relevant to the extent that it counts as evidence for her going on
a ski trip. Another way to see this is to consider the intuitive causal relationships that hold between the
variables. Whether Sue passes the exam causally influences whether her father takes her on a ski trip, which
causally influences whether she buys a new ski outfit, and there are no other causal relationships between the
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Figure 1: The Bayesian Network for the ski trip example
variables. But then the causal Markov condition, which tells us that ‘causes screen of their effects’ (see e.g.
Sprites et al. (2000)), implies that B is probabilistically independent of E once we condition on any value of
S. Thus, we can safely assume that B is probabilistically independent of E conditional on any value of S.
This assumption is encoded in the Bayesian Network depicted in Figure 1.
To complete the Bayesian Network, we have to fix the prior probability of E, i.e.
P (E) = e, (29)
and the conditional probabilities
P (S|E) = x1 , P (S|¬E) = y1 (30)
P (B|S) = x2 , P (B|¬S) = y2.
With this, we obtain:
P ∗(E) =
e x1 x2
e x1 x2 + e (y1 x2 + y1 y2)
(31)
Hence, P ∗(E) > P (E) iff
k0 :=
x1 x2
y1 x2 + y1 y2
> 1. (32)
To proceed, we have to determine whether the condition k0 > 1 holds. From the story it is clear that there is
no reason for Harry to expect Sue to buy a skiing outfit if she is not invited on a skiing trip. Hence, y2 ≈ 0
and therefore
k0 ≈ x1
y1
. (33)
It is also clear from the story that it is more likely that Sue’s father invites her for a ski trip if she passes the
exam than if she does not pass the exam. Hence, x1 > y1 and thus k0 > 1.
We have therefore shown that conditionalising on the material conditional E ⊃ S and on the proposition
B gives the intuitively correct result for the ski trip example.
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B.2 Minimising the f-Divergence
Ski1 implies that Q(B) = q1 + q3 + q5 + q7 = 0. Hence, q1 = q3 = q5 = q7 = 0. Ski1 implies that Q(S|E) = 1.
Hence, Q(E,¬S) = q3 + q4 = 0 and therefore q4 = 0. With this, we can compute the f -divergence:
F = p1 f(q1/p1) + p5 f(q5/p5) + p7 f(q7/p7) (34)
Differentiating F by q1, q5 and q7, respectively, and setting the resulting expressions equal to zero yields (using
the convexity of f) q1/p1 = q5/p5 = q7/p7. Hence, for i = 1, 5, 7,
qi =
pi
p1 + p5 + p7
.
Comparing this result with eqs. (28), we confirm that P ∗ = Q for the ski trip example.
References
Adams, E. (1975). The Logic of Conditionals. Synthese Library, Vol. 86. Boston: D. Reidel.
Ali, N., N. Chater and M. Oaksford (2011). The Mental Representation of Causal Conditional Reasoning.
Cognition 119(3): 403–418.
Amari, S.I. (2009). α-Divergence Is Unique, Belonging to Both f -Divergence and Bregman Divergence Classes.
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 55(11). DOI 10.1109/TIT.2009.2030485.
Bennett, J. (2003). A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bishop, M. and J.D. Trout (2005). The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology. Nous 39 (4): 694–714.
Bovens, L. (2010). Judy Benjamin is a Sleeping Beauty. Analysis 70 (1): 23–26.
Bovens, L. and J. L. Ferreira (2010). Monty Hall Drives a Wedge between Judy Benjamin and the Sleeping
Beauty: A Reply to Bovens. Analysis 70 (3): 473–81.
Bovens, L. and S. Hartmann (2003). Bayesian Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Csisza´r, I. (1967). Information-Type Measures of Difference of Probability Distributions and Indirect Obser-
vation. Studia Scientiarum Mathematicarum Hungarica 2: 299–318.
Csisza´r, I. (1975). I-Divergence Geometry of Probability Distributions and Minimisation Problems. Annals of
Probability 3(1):146–158.
37
Csisza´r, I. (1991). Why Least Squares and Maximum Entropy? An Axiomatic Approach to Inference for
Linear Inverse Problems. Annals of Statistics 19(4): 2032–2066.
Csisza´r, I. (2008). Axiomatic Characterizations of Information Measures. Entropy 10(3): 261–273.
Diaconis, P. and S. Zabell (1982). Updating Subjective Probability. Journal of the American Statistical Asso-
ciation 77: 822–830.
Douven, I. (2012). Learning Conditional Information. Mind & Language 27 (3): 239–263.
Douven, I. (2015). The Epistemology of Indicative Conditionals. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Douven, I. and R. Dietz (2011). A Puzzle about Stalnaker’s Hypothesis. Topoi 30: 31–37.
Douven, I. and J. W. Romeijn (2012). A New Resolution of the Judy Benjamin Problem. Mind 120 (479):
637–670.
Edgington, D. (1995). On Conditionals. Mind 104: 235–329.
Fernbach, P. and C. Erb (2013). A Quantitative Causal Model Theory of Conditional Reasoning. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 39(5): 1327–1343.
Fallis, D. and Lewis, P. J. (2016). The brier rule is not a good measure of epistemic utility (and other useful
facts about epistemic betterness). Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 94 (3): 576–590.
Fitelson, B. and T. Shear (forthcoming). Two Approaches to Belief Revision. To appear in Erkenntnis.
Foley, R. (2000). Working Without a Net. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Fraassen, B. van (1981). A Problem for Relative Information Minimisers in Probability Kinematics. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32: 375–379.
Fraassen, B. van, R.I.G. Hughes and G. Harman (1986). A Problem for Relative Information Minimisers,
Continued. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 37: 453–463.
Ga¨rdenfors, P. and H. Rott (1995). Belief Revision. In Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic
Programming, Vol. 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–132.
Gneiting, T. and A. Raftery (2007). Strictly Proper Scoring Rules, Prediction, and Estimation. Journal of the
American Statistical Association 102(477). DOI 10.1198/016214506000001437.
Greaves, H. and D. Wallace (2006). Justifying Conditionalisation: Conditionalisation Maximizes Expected
Epistemic Utility. Mind 115(459): 607–632.
38
Grice, P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In Cole, P. and Morgan, J. (eds), Syntax and semantics. 3: Speech
acts. New York: Academic Press, pp. 41–58.
Grove, A. and J. Halpern (1997). Probability Update: Conditioning vs. Cross-Entropy. In Proceedings of the
13th Annual Conference on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence. San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp.
208–214.
Hajek, A. (2012). The Fall of ‘Adam’s Thesis’?. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21(2): 145–161.
Huisman, L.M. (2017). Learning from Simple Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis 82(3): 583–601.
Kern-Isberner, G. (2001). Conditionals in Nonmonotonic Reasoning and Belief Revision. Berlin: Springer.
Leitgeb, H. (2017). The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Leitgeb, H. and R. Pettigrew (2010). An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of
Minimising Inaccuracy. Philosophy of Science 77: 236–272.
Levinstein, B. (2012). Leitgeb and Pettigrew on Accuracy and Updating. Philosophy of Science 79(3): 413–424.
Levinstein, B. (2017). A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility. Philosophy of Science 84(4): 613–638..
Lewis, D. (1976). Probabilities of Conditionals and Conditional Probabilities. Philosophical Review 85: 297–
315.
Lewis, D. (1999). Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Myrvold, W. (2018). Learning is a Risky Business. Preprint available at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14254/.
Nayak, A., M. Pagnucco and P. Peppas (1996). Learning From Conditionals: Judy Benjamin’s Other Problems.
In W. Wahlster (ed.): ECAI96: 12th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence. New York: Wiley, pp.
75–79.
Oaksford, M. and N. Chater (2007). Bayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pettigrew, R. (2016). Accuracy and the Laws of Credence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Popper, K. and D. Miller (1983). A Proof of the Impossibility of Inductive Probability. Nature 302: 687–688.
Schwan, B. and R. Stern (2017). A Causal Understanding of When and When Not to Jeffrey Conditionalise.
Philosopher’s Imprint 17(8): 1–21.
39
Singmann, H., K.C. Klauer and S. Beller (2016). Probabilistic Conditional Reasoning: Disentangling Form
and Content with the Dual-Source Model. Cognitive Psychology 88: 61–87.
Skovgaard Olsen, N., H. Singmann and K.C. Klauer (2016). The Relevance Effect and Conditionals. Cognition
150: 26–36.
Skyrms, B. (1984). Pragmatics and Empiricism. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sprites, P., C. Glymour and R. Scheines. (2000). Causation, Prediction and Search. Springer: New York.
Szabo, Z (ed). (2005). Semantics versus Pragmatics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trpin, B. (2018). Influence of Conditionals on Belief Updating. Unpublished PhD thesis. University of Ljubl-
jana.
Uffink, J. (1995). Can the Maximum Entropy Principle be Explained as a Consistency Requirement? Studies
in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 26: 223–261.
Vasudevan, A. (2018). Entropy and Insufficient Reason: a Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy013.
Weisberg, J. (2011). Varieties of Bayesianism. In D. Gabbay, S. Hartmann and J. Woods (eds.): Handbook of
the History of Logic. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 477–551.
40
